Identity and risk (2)

Identity is largely a product of our past. Risk concerns our expectations of the future. As has been frequently remarked in the course of the referendum debate there is a danger that the campaign will driven by fears – or fantasies about what the future holds, whether the UK leaves the EU or remains a member.

The one certainty here is that the future is unpredictable – the unanticipated ‘events’ of which Harold Macmillan is alleged to have warned when he was Prime Minister. The history of the last twenty-five years have demonstrated the unpredictability of events in spades: the unforeseen collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire in central Europe; the near-collapse of the world financial system; the Gulf and Iraq wars and their consequences; the rise of Al-Qaeda and IS; the emergence of multi-party electoral politics in the UK; the internet and mobile telephones; and so on and so on. We do not know what the future holds.

Not only are such events impossible to predict with any confidence; even in retrospect their causes and consequences are equally difficult to identify with accuracy. Zhou Enlai’s famous quip about the consequences of the French Revolution can be widely applied to other events. It follows, therefore, that attempting to assess the likely risks and benefits of a major international policy decision such as British continued membership of or withdrawal from the European Union is fraught with difficulty.

To illustrate let us consider some of the major points made by the Remain and Brexit campaigns. How can we know what the European Union will be like in the future? It has certainly changed substantially since the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, not least as a consequence of the accession of the UK and other EFTA members in the 1970s and Central European states following the collapse of the Soviet Empire. Common Market became European Economic Community which became the European Community which in turn became the European Union. It has also changed substantially following the introduction of the single market and subsequently the single currency. As enlargement and integration have increased, repeated assurances from the Commission and the Council of Ministers about subsidiarity and reducing bureaucracy do not appear to have been delivered. The much-disputed commitment to ‘ever closer union’ raises the (unanswerable) question ‘how far will integration go?’

The possibility of the accession of other states raises questions about the dilution of the original project (a point often made by other member states frustrated by the UK’s hostility to initiatives for further integration). The one certainty here is that changes to the EU will require lengthy and complex negotiation between the member-states and, if the proposals involve changes to the Treaties, ratification by all those states according to their own constitutional processes. That is not easy to achieve, as the history of the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Lisbon Treaties demonstrated. And, yes, these processes, and the substantive changes to public policy which they entail, involve significant limitations on the freedom of action of member states, including the UK. The issue is not whether we should accept limitations upon our freedom of action but whether the gains achieved outweigh the costs incurred.

Supporters of Brexit frequently argue that if the UK withdrew from the EU it would be easier for us to achieve British policy objectives in bilateral or multi-lateral discussions. Whether this would be so depends on one’s assessment of the willingness of partners in those discussions (including the UK-less EU) to come to an agreement with the British. Would ‘concessions’ on tariffs, trade regulations and the like be more likely in these bi-lateral/multi-lateral formats than as part of the EU? Or would the gains be reduced and the costs increased?

The difficult point is not whether other states, or combinations of states, would be willing to agree to a trade treaty with an ‘independent’ UK but whether terms and conditions of such treaties favourable to the UK would be more likely to be achieved by independent negotiation than in collaboration with other states. History suggests that the pursuit of free trade is more easily progressed through multi-lateral, collaborative agreements than bilateral ones – immensely difficult and lengthy through multi-lateral processes are. But what history suggests is not always an accurate guide to what will happen in any particular instance. The acid test is whether the UK’s negotiating position would be stronger or weaker if we remained in the EU or if Britain operated independently/unilaterally. At this point the arguments begin to move from analysis to prophecy and from fact to faith.

Nevertheless, there are some pointers from history which we would be wise to ponder in this debate. At the height of her economic and military power the UK has worked in alliance with other states rather than unilaterally. It was as part of a coalition of states that Britain stood against Napoleon, the German Empire, Hitler’s Third Reich and Stalin’s Soviet Union. In the twentieth century particularly, we have found it necessary to ally ourselves in the fullest sense (joint military command) with other states, especially the USA. Our attempts to take independent action, as over the Suez Canal in 1956, were not successful.

When states agree to act in concert with allies, they accept limitations on their freedom of action, their independence. The genius of the British statesmanship from William Pitt onwards has been to put together and maintain coalitions of states in pursuit of shared interests – prime amongst which for the UK has been freedom to trade. Trade is multi-lateral. From that fact alone limitations on freedom of action flow. The hard question is how to assess the benefits and costs of those limitations – and of the time, effort and resources required to maintain the multi-lateral relationships involved.

What is clear from the above is that, because the future is unknowable, there are risks whatever course of action Britain takes. The issue, therefore, is how to assess those risks. History shows how difficult such assessments are, even in retrospect. We cannot be certain that peace and prosperity (nb not just for the UK) will be more likely if Britain remains within the EU or leaves. Both campaigns have been guilty of exaggerated claims in this respect. We have to live with risk.

For Christians none of this should come as a surprise. We recognize that ultimate security can only be found in Almighty God. We remember from the the Old Testament that Israel’s rulers and people were repeatedly reminded not to put their trust in princes, nor in alliances with foreign powers, but to trust only in God Himself. We see from the New Testament that it is not Caesar who is lord but the Lord Jesus Christ. We read in St Paul’s letters in particular that only in Christ can we find ultimate security, that which transcends even the most uncertain and negative political, economic, social, personal circumstances. We do not, therefore, have to give way to fear or fatalism; rather we take confidence in His promise that as we walk with Him risk gives way to security and together in Him we find our true identity. As George VI, quoting Minnie Haskins, memorably put it in the insecure days of the phoney war in 1939, ‘put your hand into the Hand of God; that shall be better than light, and safer than a known way’. And with that confidence we can make our choice, secure in our identity and not fearing any risk.

About the author

Philip Giddings was Head of the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Reading until his retirement in 2011, with research interests in public administration, Parliament and the Ombudsman. From 1985 to 2015 he was a member of the General Synod, chairing the Mission and Public Affairs Division and its Council from 2003 to 2013 and serving as Chair of the House of Laity from 2010-15.